

VZCZCXRO2283

PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK

DE RUEHAK #1126 1311054

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 111054Z MAY 07

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2067

INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA// PRIORITY

RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY

RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY

RHMFIISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

RHMFIISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

RHMFIISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY

RHMFIISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY

RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001126

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2017

TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PREL PTER IZ TU

SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKEY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COALITION

REF: STATE 55436

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey provides significant logistical support for the coalition in Iraq, supports U.S. policy goals and the Iraqi government, and has tried to play a useful diplomatic role. At the same time, its concerns about the future of Iraq -- and in particular its discomfort about Kirkuk and the PKK -- affect Turkey's ability to be more helpful. End summary.

¶2. (C) Turkey has been considered a member of MCF-I since ¶2004. It has also granted significant use of its bases and airspace to support coalition activities. We use the cargo hub at Incirlik Air Base to deliver 74% of all air cargo to coalition forces in Iraq; over 292 million pounds of equipment has been moved since the hub opened in May 2005, saving \$160 million annually over flights from bases in Western Europe. U.S. KC-135 tankers at Incirlik have supplied 281 million pounds of fuel to fighter and transport aircraft since 2003, with over 3785 sorties flown. We use the land border at Habur Gate to deliver 25% of all coalition fuel and significant quantities of food and water for the troops. Turkey has approved overflight for thousands of sorties to Iraq for combat support.

¶3. (C) While the Turkish parliament failed on March 1, 2003 to approve the use of Turkish territory for OIF, the GOT later the same year did offer a brigade of peacekeepers (the Iraqis declined). Turkey has trained Iraqi military officers, diplomats, political parties, and media organizations. It has pledged \$50 million in reconstruction funds, but, perhaps more important, Turkey's private sector is very active in Iraq, with over \$3 billion in annual trade volume.

¶4. (C) Turkey supplies four personnel at NTM-I's facility near Baghdad, and liaison officers in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Talafar. Turkey has long maintained a presence of 1350-1500 troops at observation posts in various locations in northern Iraq. Their chief mission is to watch the PKK. We understand these troops are in turn very closely monitored by the KDP and PUK.

¶5. (C) Turkey has made a number of additional offers to

assist Iraq and us, but not all of these remain current. For example, Turkey expressed an interest in supplying personnel for the Baghdad PRT, but security concerns did not make this possible. MFA personnel told us April 27 that a number of factors would make such a contribution virtually impossible now. These include not only the security situation in Baghdad, but also Turkey's ongoing concerns about the direction of the country and the GOI's lack of commitment on the PKK issue. Our contacts added that the military is leery of training or providing equipment to the Iraqi security forces, citing the PKK issue, Kirkuk, and reports that ISF units operate with ethnic or sectarian agendas.

¶6. (SBU) Turkey's 2006 offer to devote its entire police training academy in Diyarbakir to train IP stands, but the GOI has not given an answer.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/>

WILSON